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THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF ANTITRUST
ROBERT PITOFSKY t
Although the political forces that produced the major antitrust
statutes-in 1890, 1914, 1936, and 1950-varied widely, those statutes
once enacted have almost always been enforced and interpreted so
that economic considerations were paramount. The issue among
most serious people has never been whether non-economic considera-
tions should outweigh significant long-term economies of scale, but
rather whether they had any role to play at all, and if so, how they
should be defined and measured.1
There probably has never been a period comparable to the last
decade, however, when antitrust economists and lawyers have had
such success in persuading the courts to adopt an exclusively eco-
nomic approach to antitrust questions. In this paper, I will urge
a different view. It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to ex-
clude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By
"political values," I mean, first, a fear that excessive concentration of
economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and
second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by
reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in the
economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and overrid-
ing political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy
is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but
economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so domi-
nated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the
state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.
This view is not at odds with the central beliefs of both the
"Chicago" and "Harvard" schools that the major goals of antitrust
relate to economic efficiency-to avoid the allocative inefficiencies of
monopoly power, encourage efficiency and progressiveness in the
use of resources, and perhaps, on fairness grounds, to maintain price
close to cost in order to minimize unnecessary and undesirable
accumulations of private wealth.2 Because interpretations that ex-
f Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Subsequent to the preparation and
submission of this paper, the author was appointed a commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission.
1 See, e.g., Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65
CoLum. L. RBv. 377-400, 422-66 (1965); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other
Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191
(1977).
2 For a summary of the central attitudes, principles, and spokesmen of the
"Chicago" and "Harvard" schools, see Sullivan, Book Review, 75 CoLuM. L. REv.
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clude all but economic concerns have lately become so influential,
however, it is important to explain why economic concerns, al-
though properly of paramount importance, should not control
exclusively.
It can be argued that the political considerations discussed here
are ill-defined and incapable of exact or even meaningful defini-
tion. Also, it will be difficult to balance vague concepts such as a
fear of economic conditions conducive to totalitarianism against
the efficiency loss of an industry structure that is disassembled or a
series of business transactions that are disallowed. Finally, it may
be that when such vague and controversial factors are introduced
into antitrust considerations, some enforcement officials and judges
will lose sight of the secondary role of these political factors and will
distort and misinterpret antitrust policy. There is merit to each
of these concerns. But despite the inconvenience, lack of predicta-
bility, and general mess introduced into the economists' allegedly
cohesive and tidy world of exclusively micro-economic analysis, an
antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns into account
would be unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch
with the rough political consensus that .has supported antitrust
enforcement for almost a century.3
I. POLITICAL VALUES
Those advocating a non-economic dimension to antitrust should
be as specific as possible about those concerns that they would in-
clude in an enforcement equation. The considerations I believe
must be taken into account are described below; with respect to
each, examples will indicate those enforcement areas or cases in
which such considerations appear to have played a role. Also men-
tioned briefly are some non-economic considerations that do not
have a proper role in antitrust enforcement, although they un-
1214 (1974) (reviewing M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrroFsEY & H. Gor.nscnum,
TRADE IEGULAnON: CASES AND MATE.ALS (1974)).
s See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE
L.J. 1, 34 n.131 (1977). Brodley accumulates a list of scholars who have empha-
sized the point about the consensus that supports antitrust enforcement. See par-
ticularly Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE Bussmss
EsmTAssmSENT 113, 149 (E. Cheit ed. 1964):
What makes it possible to institutionalize antitrust activities . . . is not a
consensus among economists as to its utility in enhancing economic effi-
ciency, but a rough consensus in society at large as to its value in curbing
the dangers of excessive market power. As in the beginning, it is based
on a political and moral judgment rather than the outcome of economic
measurement or even distinctively economic criteria.
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doubtedly have influenced and will continue to influence many
courts.
A. Fear of Concentrated Economic Power
If the choice were posed solely between monopoly power
achieved individually, solely as a result of efficiencies, and govern-
ment intervention to prevent concentration, the legislative history
of the Sherman Act 4 and the overwhelming weight of subsequent
judicial interpretation would opt for monopoly power.5 The most
famous judicial statement of the case for a political dimension to
antitrust-Judge Learned Hand's explanation in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America [Alcoa] " that "great industrial consoli-
dations are inherently undesirable" for political as well as economic
reasons 7-granted as much by accepting as an absolute defense the
explanation that such a market position was brought about solely
through superior skill, foresight, and industry.8
The issue is rarely posed that way, however. Instead, there is
characteristically a legal challenge to business behavior that pro-
duced or maintained monopoly power, or to mergers or cartel ar-
rangements that tend to concentrate or coordinate market power,
and a defense that the behavior or arrangements are efficient and
therefore tend to contribute to consumer welfare.
As will be developed in a subsequent section of this paper,9
Congress has in its antitrust enactments-most clearly when it
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
5 See 21 CONG. E~c. 3152 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar, speaking on § 2):
[A] man who merely by superior skill and intelligence . .. got the whole
business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopo-
list, but that it [monopoly] involved something like the use of means which
made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like the
engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged in the same
business.
See also United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390-91
(1956).
6 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7 Id. 428. In a frequently quoted passage, Judge Hand suggested the following
congressional motive for the enactment of the Sherman Act:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a
system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own
skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept the discretion of a few. These considerations, which we have sug-
gested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove
to have been in fact its purposes.
ac. 427.
8Id.
9 See text accompanying notes 29-39 infta.
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amended section 7 of the Clayton Act in 195010-exhibited a clear
concern that an economic order dominated by a few corporate
giants could, during a time of domestic stress or disorder, facilitate
the overthrow of democratic institutions and the installation of a
totalitarian regime. That concern about economic power and the
desire that it be dispersed complements the general American gov-
ernmental preference for a system of checks and balances and dis-
tribution of authority to prevent abusive actions by the state. The
result is a "tilt" in antitrust, usually evidenced by the design of
rules limiting the behavior of monopolists or candidates for mo-
nopoly power, and limiting concentration by merger in ways that
occasionally incur costs in terms of lost efficiencies.
Perhaps a few examples will help make the point more con-
crete. If General Motors were to announce a merger with IBM
or United States Steel with Xerox, and if those mergers were part
of a growing merger trend among the top Fortune 200, it seems
unlikely that the legality of those transactions would be fully ex-
plored from an antitrust point of view solely by an investigation of
the extent to which one company bought products from the other
or was a potential entrant into the other's product line. Alterna-
tively, suppose that a single wealthy family were to acquire the
leading newspaper in each of the twenty largest cities in the United
States. One possible response would be enactment of special legis-
lation to head off that development. If a bill were to become bot-
tled up in committee, however, the Sherman Act should be suffici-
ently flexible to take into account that threat to political values.
Finally, the bedrock antitrust rule that efficient, profit-maximizing
conduct that would be legal if engaged in by a small company be-
comes illegal if part of an unreasonably exclusionary program to
maintain monopoly power-for example, acquisition and aggressive
enforcement of patents 1 or a sales policy that encourages leasing
over purchases 12-can only be understood in light of an antagonism
to monopoly power because of political concerns and "in spite of
possible costs." Is
10 Ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)).
II See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
12 See, e.g., Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
13 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945).
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It is impossible, of course, to prove that massively concentrated
economic power, or state intervention induced by that level of con-
centration, is incompatible with liberal, constitutional democracy.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that historical and contemporaneous
democracies are almost invariably associated with market systems,
while totalitarian regimes (fascist and communist) almost always are
not. Professor Lindblom has noted, as a matter of experience if not
logic, that there appears to be an underlying common basis for
democracy and a market economy, and common characteristics be-
tween democracy and a deconcentrated economic system:
[Democracies] are systems of rules for constraining
rather than mobilizing authority. They grow out of a strug-
gle to control authority rather than to create it or make it
more effective. They are therefore political systems that
are, again, like markets. They practice decentralization,
diffusion of influence and power, and mutual adjustments
so that individuals in small groups rather than national
collectivities can strive for whatever they wish.14
It is sometimes argued that it is pointless to deconcentrate in-
dustries or to prevent increases in firm size in the name of pro-
tecting the political process because associations of small firms with
a common interest are as effective (perhaps more effective because of
the appearance of numbers) as larger business units pressing for
particular political goals. A striking initial point about this argu-
ment is that there are little or no relevant data one way or another
on the question. However, the contention that groups of firms are
the equivalent of a single firm in organizing to achieve political
goals does fly in the face of what we know about firm behavior in
the analogous area of cartel organization. We know that, given a
large number of participants, different levels of efficiency and ca-
pacity, and different outlooks about the rewards of vigorous com-
petition or cautious cooperation, cartels are notoriously difficult to
organize and maintain."5 In the absence of contrary evidence, one
might reasonably expect that the kind of uniform commitment to a
single set of political goals that might constitute some threat to
political stability should be much easier to organize, coordinate, and
maintain when relatively few different political and economic in-
terests need to be consulted.
14 C. LINDBLOM, POLTrICS AND MAKETS 165 (1977).
15 See generally L. SuLLIvAN, LANDBOOx OF THE LAw OF ANIRlusr 162-63
(1977).
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B. Reduction in the Range of Private Discretion
Professors Blake and Jones have written:
Another political objective of antitrust is the enlarge-
ment of individual liberty. Not only are we interested in
material well-being and distrustful of political power, but
we also have a strong libertarian streak. In the absence
of strong countervailing considerations, we favor freedom
of action and the wide range of choice that freedom im-
plies . . . . [T]he individual who wants to be an en-
trepreneur rather than an employee ought not to have his
opportunities restricted by unnecessary barriers to entry, or
by trade practices designed specifically to eliminate him
from the field.
16
Part of the reason we prefer a free-market system over au-
thoritarian alternatives is because important economic decisions
that have wide public consequences-which products to make, which
technologies to use, where and how much to sell-become subject
to the discipline of the market. Every firm is relieved to some extent
from the unrelenting demands of a market model, but as markets
become concentrated, firms larger, barriers to entry formidable, and
prospects of takeover or failure remote, existing sellers are more
and more removed from that discipline and would-be challengers
find themselves excluded from a fair opportunity to compete. 17
Some of the bank merger cases,18 which preserve the oppor-
tunity for businessmen to seek alternative sources of capital for
investment plans, can be defended on efficiency grounds, but also
evidence this concern to disperse decisionmaking authority. Boy-
cott cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to permit groups
of sellers to assume an "extra-governmental" role and displace the
market mechanism, regardless of the economic justification, are more
comprehensible if this set of values is taken into account.' 9 Sim-
16 Blake & Jones, supra note 1, at 383-84.
17 This political concern has been described as more capable of explicit state-
ment as a result of recent advances in the theory of managerial behavior. See
Brodley, supra note 3, at 35-36. There is an echo of that concern in the legislative
history of the Sherman Act, where Senator Hoar described the law's concern as
"the sole engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men from
engaging in fair competition with him." 21 CONG. Bxc. 3152 (1890), quoted in
United States v. E.I duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 n.15 (1956).
18 See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350
(1970); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). For a
discussion of Philadelphia National Bank, see text following note 67 infra.
19 See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), discussed in Blake & Jones, supra note 1, at 429-30.
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ilarly, if several leading oil companies not currently in the coal
business were to attempt to acquire several leading coal companies,
any future decision to develop alternative energy sources, dearly of
crucial significance to the national welfare, would be significantly
immunized against the discipline of the market. Even if there
were some efficiencies to the combination and absolutely no pos-
sibility that either company would expand into the product market
of the other, an antitrust challenge should incorporate some con-
cern that the welfare of the country is being placed in the hands
of a few economically powerful firms and individuals. This is not to
imply that non-economic concerns should be dispositive, but only
that they are relevant and should be taken into account.
C. Avoidance of Political Interference
The Sherman Act was enacted after a decade of unusual labor
violence and agrarian unrest culminating in widespread strikes and
anarchist agitation.20 It was a period during which there was wide
discussion of alternative economic systems. Thorelli's study of
Sherman Act legislative history reports that at least one major
theme of legislative purpose was the desire to improve the free
market system in order to head off direct regulation or Marxist
solutions.21
Similar notions were even more pronounced in the legislative
history leading to the enactment of revised section 7 of the Clayton
Act in 1950 22 and should continue to be influential today. If a few
companies were to grow to dominate most of the major product
markets in the United States, it is inconceivable that those com-
panies would be left free of political accountability. At a minimum
they would be required to report the details of their operations far
more extensively than companies do today, and they would be the
subject of constant legislative investigation and oversight. Eventu-
ally such companies surely would come under direct governmental
20 See generally T. BRooKs, Tom AND TnouBr.u 38-71 (1964). For a summary
of the historical context of the antitrust statutes, see L. SULLivAN, supra note 15, at
1218-23.
21H. THORELL, ThE FEDERAL ANTrrRUST PoLIcY (1955). In a frequently
quoted debate speech, Senator Sherman said: "You must heed their [the voters']
appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the nihiist. Society is now
disturbed by forces never felt before .... These combinations already defy or
control powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities." 21 CoNG.
lEc. 2460 (1890), cited in H. THonELLm, supra, at 180. See also Blake, Con-
glomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. Rtv. 555, 575-76 (1973).
22Ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)). See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
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control. An antitrust system that occasionally disregards claims of
efficiency, as in the imposition of per se rules against certain kinds
of horizontal cartels 23 or unwillingness to take dubious evidence
of efficiencies into account in judging the legality of mergers, 24
reflects these political concerns.
A level of industrial concentration that would raise a serious
threat of provoking state nationalization probably is not present in
the economy today. It is debatable whether there has been any
significant recent increase in concentration among the top 200
American corporations; even if there were some increase in con-
centration, foreign competition and the improved ability of firms to
market their products at greater distances from their home plants
probably means that most markets are at least as deconcentrated to-
day as they were twenty or thirty years ago. As a result, there are
relatively few situations today in which a political dimension must be
incorporated to explain a result. That need not always be the
case, however. Technological developments or changes in world
trade patterns may generate fierce pressures toward concentration.
It would be unfortunate if the antitrust laws were interpreted so
that they would be impotent in future times of stress to play their
role as a defense against undue concentration of economic power.
D. Non-Economic Concerns That Should
Be Disregarded
There are a number of non-economic concerns that can play
no useful role in antitrust enforcement. These include (1) protec-
tion for small businessmen against the rigors of competition, (2)
special rights for franchisees and other distributors to continuing
access to a supplier's products or services regardless of the efficiency
of their distribution operation and the will of the supplier (a kind
of civil rights statute for distributors), and (3) income redistribu-
tion to achieve social goals.
In terms of legislative history, these different goals stand on
very different bases. There was legislative history leading to the
enactment of the Sherman Act and to the amendment of section 7 of
23 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), in which
evidence of reasonable price in defense of a price-fixing cartel was rejected precisely
because constant government intervention would be necessary to determine whether
prices were indeed reasonable.
24See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Possible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some
mergers that lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the
balance in favor of protecting competition.").
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the Clayton Act in 1950 showing that Congress was concerned with
the disappearance of small independent entrepreneurs and their
displacement by massive corporations.25 In 1936 this was of course
a dominant concern of the legislature in enacting the Robinson-
Patman Act. 26 On the other hand, there are many other indica-
tions in the legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and
in the law as interpreted, that the antitrust laws were designed to
preserve competition. These twin goals are impossible to reconcile
in circumstances in which small business is disadvantaged by true
efficiencies of scale.27
After decades of agonizing interpretation, a sort of working
compromise has been reached, so that the goal of antitrust is to
preserve a competitive process even at the cost at times of the dis-
appearance of less efficient small businesses. That solution is de-
fensible in part because policies that would discriminate in favor
of small business in pursuit of mythic virtues of smallness would
themselves be inconsistent with another set of political values:
maintenance of conditions of equality of opportunity for all busi-
nessmen through limitations on the range of private discretion.
Moreover, preservation of a competitive system, in part through
vigorous antitrust enforcement, will protect small business against
the use of unfair tactics by larger companies to gain advantages
unrelated to superior skill or efficiency of those larger units.
By contrast, there is no obvious theme in the legislative history
of any of the antitrust laws that Congress' purpose was to create
procedural protection for distributors or, even more farfetched, to
achieve income redistribution. Looking beyond legislative history,
these non-economic concerns play no useful role because it is not
possible to achieve those goals to any significant extent through
antitrust interpretation. 28 Inefficient small businesses will suffer
losses regardless of how the antitrust laws are interpreted, and the
25 See note 34 infra.
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
27 On the promotion of small business enterprises, see Elzinga, supra note 1, at
1196-1200.
28 On using the antitrust laws to achieve income redistribution one author has
written:
The problem of poverty is attributed more often to the low level of educa-
tion and job skills of the poor, insufficient aggregate demand, the distorted
incentives of current welfare policies, drug addiction and alcoholism, racial
discrimination, and a cognitive present orientation among the poor that cuts
against exchanging present for future satisfaction. Thus, the pursuit of
egalitarian income distribution through antitrust enforcement is likely to
have limited results.
Id. 1195-96 (footnote omitted).
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income redistribution that can be achieved through antitrust chan-
nels is trivial. Moreover, even if Congress were viewed as truly
committed to some or all of those goals, they could be achieved more
efficiently and with fewer adverse effects through direct subsidy,
taxation, and welfare programs.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION OF NON-ECONOMIC
CONCERNS
Factors other than strictly economic concerns should be taken
into account because the legislative history of the antitrust statutes,
in its own right and as interpreted authoritatively in the courts,
so requires, because an exclusively economic approach reflects an
unrealistically optimistic view of the certainty introduced by that
kind of analysis, and because the introduction of non-economic
factors does not result in an undue interference with effective
enforcement.
A. Legislative History
The Sherman Act and most of its amendments do not address
specific issues of antitrust enforcement. The key terms "restraint
of trade" in section 1 of the Sherman Act and "monopolize" in
section 2 were not defined, and the legislative history does not
reflect consideration of the possibility that unrelieved pursuit of a
free-market competitive system might lead to adverse non-economic
effects.
29
This failure to address the efficiency/political-effects trade-off
is not hard to understand. Comprehensive antitrust regulation was
a new concept to all legislators, and the most authoritative and
exhaustive reviews of the legislative history have detected a series
of vague and not always consistent strands of legislative intent.3 0
As many have observed, Congress elected generally to leave specific
enforcement decisions to the judiciary.
But putting aside the Sherman Act and its admittedly obscure
legislative history, can we discern anything with respect to legisla-
tive intent from subsequent antitrust statutes? If we can, it seems
clear that those subsequent statutes must be interpreted to incor-
29 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
30 One of these strands involved the desire to avoid the enhancement of prices.
See H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 180. There was also a broader concern that
concentrated economic power would undermine the opportunities of individuals and
small businessmen. W. LETwix, LAw AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AM:ERICA 59
(1965); H. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 180. It was believed that these effects
would eventually undermine a private enterprise system. Id. 227. See generally
Blake, supra note 21, at 575-76.
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porate political concerns, and it appears arguable that these subse-
quent expressions define Congress' vague intentions in earlier en-
actments.3' Specifically, can fair-minded commentators read the
legislative history of amended section 7-the most recent major sub-
stantive revision of general antitrust policy-and conclude that Con-
gress intended to regulate mergers and joint ventures without taking
into account the political consequences of what it perceived to be
an ongoing merger movement?
Section 7 outlaws only those mergers the effect of which "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a mo-
nopoly," 32 and thereby fairly establishes the primacy of economic
concerns. There is no record that any legislator has suggested that
a merger be challenged solely or principally because of an ad-
verse effect on small business, employment opportunities, equitable
distribution of wealth, or long-term threats to the stability of the
country's democratic process. The question remains, however,
whether such factors can be taken into account at all in deciding
at what level to draw the line describing unacceptable reductions in
competition.
Some of the key passages of section 7's legislative history reveal
strong congressional concern with the political implications of
mergers; in this era of augmented influence by economists and
economically sophisticated lawyers, we seem to have lost sight of
31 Using subsequent legislative history to illuminate the intent of an earlier
Congress seems particularly appropriate when we deal with "a comprehensive char-
ter of economic liberty," Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958),
written with a "generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 360 (1933). It also seems particularly appropriate because we deal with the
"antitrust laws"--an interrelated network of statutes that supplements and amends
earlier versions-designed in toto to govern marketplace competition. Cf. United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) (describing and interpreting the
Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts as "interlacing statutes").
A similar situation was presented in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976) in which Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, found that
the Sherman Act's framers never directly faced the question of the extent to which
the Sherman Act preempted inconsistent state law. His separate opinion cited a
series of subsequent congressional enactments exempting particular kinds of state
regulation-fair trade, insurance regulations, and agricultural marketing arrange-
ments-to indicate Congress' earlier "intent" that, absent these special exemptions,
these state arrangements would have been superseded by the Sherman Act. 428
U.S. at 607-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-68 (1974) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, in part by reading a series of subsequent statutes as part of a
historical process through which Congress defined the roles of federal and state
courts); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845) ("if it
can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legis-
lature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative
declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.").
32 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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these attitudes. Consider the statement by Representative Celler,
one of the co-sponsors of the amendment, at the time the bill that
eventually became section 7 was originally introduced:
I want to point out the danger of this trend toward
more and better combines. I read from a report filed with
former Secretary of War Royall as to the history of the
cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany:
Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a
great series of industrial monopolies in steel, rub-
ber, coal and other materials. The monopolies
soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to
power and forced virtually the whole world into
war.
The report continues:
A high degree of concentration throughout
industry fosters the formation of cartels and
readily enables a war-minded government to
mobilize for hostilities. Such was the history of
war preparations in Germany in both World War
I and World War II.
Mr. Walter Lippmann, writing in Fortune magazine
several years ago, stated correctly:
The development of combinations in busi-
ness, which are able to dominate markets in which
they sell their goods, and in which they buy their
labor and materials, must lead irresistibly to some
form of state collectivism. So much power will
never for long be allowed to rest in private hands,
and those who do not wish to take the road to the
politically administered economy of socialism,
must be prepared to take the steps back toward
the restoration of the market economy of private
competitive enterprise.
All these warnings must make us pause.33
Now consider the following characteristic statement by Senator
Kefauver, the other leading sponsor of the bill:
I think we must decide very quickly what sort of coun-
try we want to live in. . . . The present trend of great
33 95 CONG. REc. 11,486 (1949).
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corporations to increase their economic power is the antith-
esis of meritorious competitive development. It is no ac-
cident that we now have a big Government, big labor
unions, and big business. The concentration of great eco-
nomic power in a few corporations necessarily leads to the
formation of large Nation-wide unions. The development
of the two necessarily lends [sic] to big bureaus in the
Government to deal with them. Local economic inde-
pendence cannot be preserved in the face of consolidations
such as we have had during the past few years. The control
of American business is steadily being transferred, I am
sorry to have to say, from local communities to a few large
cities in which central managers decide the policies and the
fate of the far-flung enterprises they control. Millions of
people depend helplessly on their judgment. Through
monopolistic mergers the people are losing power to direct
their own economic welfare. When they lose the power to
direct their economic welfare they also lose the means to
direct their political future.
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken
place in other nations where mergers and concentrations
have placed economic control in the hands of a very few
people is too clear to pass over easily. A point is eventu-
ally reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this
country, where the public steps in to take over when con-
centration and monopoly gain too much power. The tak-
ing over by the public through its government always fol-
lows one or two methods and has one or two political
results. It either results in a Fascist state or the nationaliza-
tion of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist
state. Most businessmen realize this inevitable result. Cer-
tain monopolistic interests are being very short-sighted in
not appreciating the plight to which they are forcing their
Government. 4
To some extent, preservation of a competitive process would
achieve the goals that were of concern to these spokesmen; hence
it is arguable that the statute is responsibly enforced if exclusively
economic considerations, including the dispersal of monopoly power
achieved other than by patents or economies of scale, are applied.
Legislative history focusing on the protection of competition, not
34 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950). A concern that corporate concentration will
inevitably diminish individual freedom is hardly an exclusive preoccupation of
"populist" legislators. See Elzinga, supra note 1, at 1200 (citing warnings to that
effect by Friedrick Hayek and Milton Friedman).
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competitors, supports that view.m But we know that conflicts be-
tween political and economic goals do arise-for example, when a
merger generating efficiencies contributes significantly to economic
concentration in a given market. Is it conceivable that the sponsors
of this bill would accept the notion that preservation of efficiencies
ought to be treated as paramount? 36
One might argue that these are the special views of Senators
Celler and Kefauver-political hawks on the question of antitrust
enforcement-and are not representative of the views of a broad
segment of the majority voting in favor of the bill. That is simply
not true. A striking feature of the legislative history of amended
section 7 was the widely-shared perception of danger to the political
well-being of the country and its citizens stemming from the merger
movement.31 As Professor Bok has reported, "there emerges a
common definition of the problem at hand, a common philosophy
as to its import, and a common notion, on a very general plane, of
what the new act could do about it." 3s
Virtually all proponents of the bill who spoke asserted that the
merger trend must be blocked because concentrated economic power
would lead to increased government control, because freedom would
corrode and totalitarianism prosper, and because absentee owner-
ship by large corporations would diminish local initiative and civic
responsibility.3 9 Of course, that kind of language is not helpful in
deciding whether a merger between two companies of given size in
specific markets is legal. Congress in 1950 left those questions to
the courts much as it did in 1890. But to proceed from that start-
35 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
86 An alternate way of presenting the same argument is to point out that the
Senate and House reports do not expressly indicate an intention to interpret the
statute in light of political goals. See S. Ra. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950); H.R. PnRE. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Hence, the legislative
rhetoric can be passed off as talk about "aims," and the absence of an express
commitment to political values in the reports, an expression of Congress' wish to
achieve those aims by exclusive pursuit of economic goals.
Silence in the reports on political issues, however, does not necessarily support
that view. In fact, the reports were devoted almost entirely to an explication of
the technical aspects of the statute-for example, the reason for the deletion of any
reference to the effect on competition between the acquiring and acquired firms-
and did not refer to problems generated by the occasional trade-off between effi-
ciency considerations and political values. Accordingly, it seems fair to look beyond
the Senate and House reports to the debates and focus upon the reiteration in those
debates of the pervasive theme of concern for the protection of political values.
37 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 H nv. L. Ray. 226, 234-37 (1960).
38 Id. 234.
39 Id. 235-36. The Supreme Court has ratified the view that Congress was
intent on stemming a rising tide of concentration because of a threat to non-
economic values. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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ing point to the conclusion that Congress in 1950 would be satis-
fied with a judicial interpretation that excluded all non-economic
concerns-a position advocated largely by scholars who would not
themselves regard the merger movement as a serious threat to politi-
cal values-reflects a striking disregard for the political process.
B. Feasibility of Incorporating Non-Economic
Concerns
Suppose a political component were to be included in an anti-
trust enforcement equation. Would that introduce chaos into what
otherwise would be an orderly, reliable, and predictable regulatory
process? Such a result is unlikely. Those opposed to the inclusion
of political factors exaggerate the precision of an enforcement ap-
proach that incorporates solely economic concerns, and overstate the
administrative difficulties and enforcement costs of taking non-
economic concerns into account.
1. Illusion of Certainty
Economists and schools of economists disagree on a theoretical
level with respect to many crucial antitrust policy issues: Is a vigor-
ous policy of merger prevention justified because cartels are easier
to organize and police in a concentrated market? Does vertical
integration lead to significant anticompetitive effects? Do massive
advertising expenditures diminish or improve opportunities for
entry by new firms? Different advocates of the economic approach
would answer these and many other policy questions in entirely
different ways.
Even if economic theory were clear and consistent, economics
provides no system for reliably determining economic effect. We
know that a market served by fifteen or twenty firms that is con-
verted by merger to a monopoly or duopoly will produce a different
level of price and perhaps efficiency. In contrast, a merger in a
ten-firm market between the sixth and eighth firms reduces the total
number to nine but allows the combined enterprise to challenge
the leaders more effectively. There is no reliable way to determine
either the pro- or anti-competitive effect of that merger with any-
thing approaching scientific reliability. As a result, antitrust en-
forcement along economic lines already incorporates large doses of
hunch, faith, and intuition.4
4 o See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 6-7.
1979] 1065
1066 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Another reason that antitrust is something less than a precise
science is that so many antitrust questions are factually indetermi-
nate, a condition exacerbated by unavoidable limitations on the
judicial process. The recent controversy over the proposed rule
that a monopolist does not engage in exclusionary pricing if prices
charged are in excess of average variable costs provides an apt
example.41 Among the reasons advanced for such a rule is that a
single bright-line formula will contribute to increased reliability
and predictability in enforcement. Many courts, persuaded by
those arguments, appear to be adopting the average variable cost
formula.
42
It is of course desirable, all things being equal, to adopt pro-
spective rules that are workable. Nevertheless, few if any experi-
enced litigators believe that proof of average variable cost-with
accounting records in the hands of defendants and the inevitable
slippage of the discovery process-would be anything but a rough
approximation. If the evidence relates to a multi-plant firm and
involves complicated problems of allocation of general overhead, it
is uncertain that even a rough approximation is achievable. Again,
the argument that inclusion of political factors will introduce an
element of unpredictability into an otherwise reliable enforcement
system seems unrealistic.
2. Compatibility of Political and Economic
Considerations
Vigorous antitrust enforcement usually serves both economic
and political goals, at least as political goals have been defined here.
Elimination or containment of monopoly and elimination of un-
necessary barriers to entry and unreasonable business practices not
only promote economic efficiency but tend to avoid undue concen-
trations of economic power, to reduce the range of private discre-
tion in the business field, and to minimize the risks of state inter-
ference. But unavoidable inconsistencies occasionally do arise, and
the question at that point is whether inclusion of political values,
reasonably defined and weighted, leads to unacceptable administra-
41Compare Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HAIv. L. REv. 697, 716-18 (1975) with Scherer,
Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HAuv. L. REv. 869, 873-75
(1976) and Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284, 286-306 (1977).
42 See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tive or anti-efficiency costs. That depends on how political values
are introduced into the antitrust equation.
III. POLrrIcAL FACTORS APPLIED
A. Some General Limits
It has been argued that if political concerns are to be satisfied,
there is no clear stopping place short of atomistic competition.
43
That position overstates the difficulties of introducing political
values to leaven what would otherwise be an exclusively economic
analysis of antitrust problems.
Political concerns ought to be treated as limited factors that
influence the way in which prospective rules are designed to ac-
complish antitrust objectives. If the rules themselves are dear,
introduction of a political dimension will not generate undue un-
certainty in enforcement. Moreover, because these political con-
cerns are clearly and expressly secondary, major dislocations in com-
petitive policy will be avoided.44
The following sections will indicate how political considera-
tions have properly influenced the development of prospective rules
with respect to horizontal mergers, an area of major significance in
antitrust enforcement.
B. Political Factors in Horizontal Merger
Enforcement
There is a consensus among economists and antitrust lawyers
that mergers among competitors should be prohibited when they
lead to concentration, because explicit collusion is more difficult to
detect and tacit collusion more likely to occur in concentrated
43 See Borl The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 831-32 (1965).
44 Perhaps political concerns also can legitimately serve as a tie-breaker in
individual cases. For example, they may contribute to a finding of illegality with
respect to a merger of two very large companies when there are neither significant
anticompetitive effects nor significant efficiencies as a result of the merger. It is
hard to believe the Supreme Court decision in United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) [duPont-GM], in which the Court ruled that
duPont's competitors in the automotive finishes and fabrics market were foreclosed
from that market because of the close relationship between duPont and GM (which
could have been the reason for GM's purchasing most of its requirements from
duPont), is not explained in part by the idea that those two companies were re-
garded as "too big" and "too influential" from a political point of view.
A problem with that kind of enforcement approach is that it is ad hoc with
respect to specific transactions and may be unfair to the parties. Unfairness is
particularly pronounced if private treble damage exposure must be taken into
account.
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markets. 45 There is also general agreement that cartels are in-
herently unstable, but that stability can be increased (and the costs
of cartel administration decreased) if the number of sellers of com-
peting products, and hence the number of potential defectors from
the cartel, is reduced.
46
Against that policy background, several crucial policy issues re-
lating to horizontal mergers arise: First, what is the minimum level
at which a lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly
will occur as a result of mergers? Second, assuming a merger pro-
duces significant anticompetitive effects, should countervailing com-
petitive effects in another market be taken into account in measur-
ing the net competitive effect of a merger? Third, to what extent
and in which circumstances will merger rules be modified to take
into account efficiencies resulting from the merger?
Although the law on these questions may be in a state of flux,
it is likely that the minimum levels at which mergers can be chal-
lenged successfully remain in the five-to-ten-percent range, at least
when markets are moderately or highly concentrated. 47 The courts
will not consider evidence of redeeming competitive effects in an-
other market.48 Efficiencies resulting from a merger are taken into
account as a preliminary matter in that horizontal mergers, despite
their inevitable price and market allocation effects, are not judged
under a per se standard, but evidence of efficiency is probably
irrelevant under present law as a defense to any specific merger.49
This analysis assumes that the misstep in the earlier Brown Shoe 50
opinion suggesting that efficiencies of integration might be a reason
for striking down a merger,
5 1 is no longer good law.5 2
4 5 See, e.g., G. STIGLER, A Theory of Oligopoly, in TnE ORANzATION OF
hInusm-Y 39 (1968); Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 540-51 (1965) (statement of Professor Carl Kaysen).
4 6 See Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDus-
TRIAL CoNcmmAnToN: TE NEw LEAn¢ mN 189-93, 231 (Goldschmid, Mann &
Weston eds. 1974) (summarizing relevant economic literature on the subject).
47 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (com-
bined market share of 7.5% outlawed); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 343-44 (1962) (combined market shares of 5% outlawed on ground that it
would require the courts to approve future mergers of similar market shares, thus
leading to the oligopoly Congress sought to avoid); Merger Guidelines of Dep't of
Justice, 1 TRADE R.EG. REP. (CCH) fT 4510, §§ 5-6 (1968).
48 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963).
49 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 569-71 (1972); Merger
Guidelines of Dep't of Justice, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) I 4510, § 10 (1968).
See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1966). But see
Sullivan, supra note 15, at 631.
50 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
51 Id. 344.
52 See Blake & Jones, supra note 1, at 455-57.
[Vol. 127:1051
THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF ANTITRUST
When scholars who advocate antitrust enforcement aimed ex-
clusively at serving economic goals contemplate these rules, they
understandably are driven to conclude that the rules are wrong, the
policies misguided, and the legislators and judges who impose them
unsophisticated or ill-informed. 3 A merger producing a combined
market share of five percent could occur in a market with scores of
other sellers. Even taking the "incipiency" dimension of section 7
into account, it is doubtful as a matter of economic analysis that
one could predict that a reduction in sellers from twenty to nine-
teen or even from fifteen to fourteen-except in special and unusual
circumstances-would substantially increase the likelihood of tacit
or overt collusion. It is also difficult for those who demand anti-
trust enforcement solely to achieve allocative efficiency and optimum
levels of firm size to comprehend an enforcement policy that refuses
to permit as a defense lines of evidence that show directly that these
very effects are likely to be achieved by a particular merger. On
the other hand, those who support incorporation of non-economic
considerations in antitrust enforcement may have some reservations
about specific cases and rules, but can generally support the current
lines of authority described above.54 The reasons for that support
differ and are illuminating in indicating the ways in which the
"political" thinkers part company with homo economicus.
1. Threshold Level of Illegality
Measured solely by economic concerns, formidable arguments
can be advanced that no merger ought to be prevented unless it
produces market concentration in which the top four firms account
for more than sixty percent of the market. 5 Advocates claim that
this rule would leave ample opportunity to achieve by merger op-
timum levels of scale, and would not introduce any serious likeli-
hood of tacit collusion.56
53 BoRn, TnE ANTrmuST PARADOX 200-04 (1978); Bowman, Contrasts in Anti-
trust Theory II, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 417, 418 (1965) ("Application of oligopoly
analyses to market situations such as existed in the Brown Shoe case is grotesque.")
(citation omitted); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 CoLum. L. REv. 282, 299-313 (1975).
54 See notes 45-52 supra & accompanying text.
5 Born, supra note 53, at 205-06 (arguing that mergers up to 60% or 70% of
a market should be permitted, but interpreting Congress' wish to prevent 30%-40%
combinations); Posner, supra note 53, at 312-13 (advocating that position and citing
economic and legal literature in its support).
56 The theoretical justification for that view appears to be that in less concen-
trated markets, non-conspiratorial uniform behavior either will not occur or, if it
does, can be challenged by a more imaginative application of cartel theory in actions
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The four-firm/sixty-percent line seems roughly equivalent to
the standard governing merger enforcement under the Sherman Act
or under section 7 of the Clayton Act prior to its amendment.
5 7
Given Congress' clear intention in amending the Clayton Act to
reach far beyond Sherman Act limits as interpreted in United States
v. Columbia Steel Co.,5 other commentators defend an anti-merger
rule at a lower threshold level. If the "incipiency" dimension of
section 7 is taken into account, and if it is recognized that it is vir-
tually impossible as a matter of economics to describe precisely at
what point concentration produces conditions that facilitate collu-
sion, one can persuasively argue that the threshold level ought to
be well below the four-firm/sixty-percent level.59 Even so, it is
extremely difficult to defend, strictly on economic grounds, outlaw-
ing the kind of five-to-ten-percent horizontal mergers in Brown
Shoe v. United States,60 United States v. Von's Grocery,61 and United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co.
62
The Supreme Court's position in those cases is comprehensible
only if one recalls Congress' concern about the political conse-
quences of what it believed was a rising tide of concentration. Ob-
viously, no particular merger will threaten to produce a nondemo-
cratic political order or generate an unacceptable level of private
corporate discretion; it was the general trend that Congress per-
ceived and that it regarded as a threat to political values. More-
over, it does not seem an adequate answer to say that if solely
political concerns were at issue it would be enough to outlaw
mergers among companies accounting for large market shares-not
five-percent mergers in the retail trade. Whether right or wrong
on the underlying facts, Congress was concerned with a trend-a
for conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 SrA. L. 1Ev. 562 (1969).
57See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964)
(violation of the Sherman Act was found with respect to a merger of the first and
fourth largest commercial banks in a city, with a combined share of about 50%, and
with the top four firms accounting for about 80% of assets, deposits, and loans);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (no violation of the
Sherman Act when combined market share in the horizontal line was 24%).
58334 U.S. 495 (1948). See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1949). The Senate committee expressly stated that "the bill is not intended to
revert to the Sherman Act test. The intent here ... is to cope with monopolistic
tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as
would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
4-5 (1950).
59 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 15, at 620-21.
60370 U.S. 294 (1962).
61384 U.S. 270 (1966).
62384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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dynamic process-that it believed had to be checked early, before it
developed irresistible political momentum, to preserve fundamental
democratic values. Although some of these cases push to the ex-
treme the goal of stopping trends toward concentration, Congress
was aware that much concentration in the country had occurred as
a result of prior failures to deal with merger trends and apparently
was prepared to pay a price to ensure that those failures would
not continue.
Antitrusters who emphasize a political dimension in antitrust
need not agree with the result in individual cases, including those
that expressly cite political factors. In Von's Grocery, 3 a merger
between the third and sixth-ranked retail food sellers in Los An-
geles, with a combined market share of 7.5%, was struck down even
though entry was easy and the market only moderately concen-
trated, on grounds that (1) there was a pronounced trend toward
concentration underway, and (2) to protect small dealers ("worthy
men") from being driven out of business. 4 Even political anti-
trusters can regard that result as dubious. During the same period
in which the number of single store outlets had fallen sharply, the
number of chains increased from ninety-six to 150, and the market
share of the top two chains declined from twenty-one percent to four-
teen percent. 5 Thus, the trend among those companies that might
have been induced to engage in cartels or drift into patterns of tacit
collusion-that is, the top firms in the market-was toward deconcen-
tration rather than concentration. Also, entry barriers were low
and existing concentration moderate. Finally, the political values
that the Court espoused-protection of small businessmen against
the rigors of competition from larger, more efficient rivals-would
not be served by preventing mergers among relatively small firms
near the top of a loosely concentrated market.""
2. Treatment of a Defense Based on Redeeming
Competitive Values
When merging firms are relatively large in the markets in
which they sell and the merger contributes significantly to market
63 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
64 The concentration that concerned the Court arose from the fact that the
number of single store retail grocery outlets in Los Angeles had decreased from
5,365 in 1950 to 3,818 in 1961. Id. 273.
O5 Id. 281, 290-91 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66 Id. 298 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that the small businessman's "plight"
in this market was that he was strong and secure and, indeed, was often the most
aggressive competitor against larger chains).
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concentration, it is relatively easy to predict significant anticom-
petitive effects on the basis of non-political values. Those mergers
facilitate the organization of explicit cartels and increase the likeli-
hood of inter-firm patterns of coordinated competitive behavior.
Nevertheless, defense counsel will frequently argue that despite the
reduction in competition in some narrow product or geographic
market, the merger allows the combined firm to compete effectively
in a different and usually more significant product or geographic
market.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank [PNB] 11 presents
a classic example of that kind of issue. The merging firms there
were the second and third largest commercial banks in the four-
county Philadelphia metropolitan area; their combined market share
after the merger would have been about thirty percent, and the two-
firm concentration ratio in the market would have increased from
forty-five to sixty percent.68 Defendants argued that the increased
lending limit of the resulting bank would have enabled it to com-
pete with the large New York banks for national loans, and the
injection of additional competition in that national market more
than compensated for any reduction of competition in the Phila-
delphia area.69
The argument in defense of the merger certainly does not
appear frivolous. In terms of national economic policy, and taking
account the ability of banks, by control of credit, to influence com-
petitive initiatives, it may very well be in the long run that addi-
tional competition for loans to nationally significant companies
would be a major pro-competitive development. And even if the
defendants were incorrect on the facts in Philadelphia National
Bank, there are bound to be many cases in which a lessening of
competition in some narrow market is counterbalanced by increases
in competition in a different larger market. Nevertheless, the
Court refused to consider the contention, noting simply that an
exception for redeeming competitive effects in another market would
create a loophole in section 7 enforcement that could lead to unac-
ceptable industrial concentration.
7 0
67374 U.S. 321 (1963).
68 Id. 364-65.
69 Id. 370-71.
70 "If anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by pro-competitive
consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in
the end as large as the industry leader." Id. 370.
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This issue of the relevance of compensating competitive effects
is a difficult, close, vexing question of antitrust policy. The result in
Philadelphia National Bank can be defended on grounds that do
not implicate political considerations-specifically, that competitive
advantages and disadvantages are difficult enough to measure, but
that it is virtually impossible to incorporate any such measurements
into a formula that will permit a conclusion with respect to the net
effect on the economy. But it is questionable whether that calcu-
lation is really any more difficult than the measurement of tradeoffs
that are characteristic of rule of reason areas, such as balancing
business reasons for an exclusive dealing contract against the anti-
competitive consequences of market foreclosure, 71 or weighing the
immediate pro-competitive effect of introducing by joint venture
a new competitor into a product area against the loss to the com-
petitive process of a "sidelines pro-competitive effect" because one
of the parents, but for the joint venture, might have remained at
the edge of the market contemplating independent entry.72 Calcu-
lation of pro- and anti-competitive effects would be no more difficult
with respect to the PNB "redeeming competitive effects issue" than
in these other areas. The difference is that the PNB rule, as much
as any rule in merger enforcement, has contributed to the success of
a policy aimed at preventing loose oligopolies from being converted
by merger into tight oligopolies, and that policy of containment is
central to the legislative purpose of revised section 7.73
3. Admissibility of Evidence of Efficiencies
Advocates of differing views of the appropriate treatment of
evidence of efficiency in merger litigation do not fall neatly into
schools. Some commentators who have criticized the narrow eco-
nomic approach would take clear evidence of efficiencies into ac-
count in close cases; 74 others who criticize "social theories" of anti-
trust enforcement would exclude evidence of economies of scale
or managerial efficiencies because they are "intractable subjects for
litigation." 75
7 1 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States [Standard Stations], 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
7 2 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
73 See note 58 supra.
74 See, e.g., Blake & Jones, supra note 1, at 456-57; Sullivan, supra note 15, at
631.
75 Posner, supra note 53, at 313. See also Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAIv. L. REV. 1313, 1339 (1965) (advocating
exclusion of evidence of efficiencies on a case-by-case basis but taking such evidence
into account in fashioning general merger rules-an approach similar to the one
taken here).
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The case for exclusion of specific evidence of economies in
defense of a merger can be expanded beyond consideration of the
difficulties of handling such evidence in trial. First, there is the
question whether any such efficiencies, assuming they do result
from a consolidation of firms, could be achieved between firms by
contract or by some sort of joint venture limited in scope and dura-
tion. Either alternative would leave the acquired firm free to pur-
sue independent competitive policies unrelated to achievement of
efficiencies. Second, if efficiencies are significant, it is likely that
firms will expand or modify their operational techniques in order
to achieve them internally. Viewed in this light, mergers may
accelerate the achievement of certain kinds of economies, but the
mergers are not essential to achieving those economies. Finally, it
seems fair to inquire whether the efficiencies will be taken out in the
form of increased profits for shareholders, or will be used by the
company to compete more aggressively and place pressure on rivals
to adopt and implement equivalent efficiencies. Assuming litiga-
tion occurs fairly promptly after the merger is inaugurated, it seems
unlikely in most instances that there will be reliable evidence of
what use will be made of savings introduced as a result of the
merger.
When each of those factors is added to considerations of com-
plexity, expense, and delay in litigation caused by the introduc-
tion of efficiency questions, a persuasive case begins to emerge
either for excluding efficiencies entirely-which seems to be the pres-
ent view of the law-or accepting such evidence only in close, ex-
ceptional cases.
Does a rule excluding evidence of efficiencies in merger litiga-
tion reflect "political" considerations? As noted, exclusion can be
justified on other grounds, but it can also reflect an essential notion
of the political goals of antitrust-that the matter of efficiencies is
not dispositive, and that an occasional loss of efficiency as a result
of antitrust enforcement can be tolerated and is to be expected if
antitrust is to serve other legitimate values. As Justice Brandeis
wrote:
The only argument that has been seriously advanced
in favor of private monopoly is that competition involves
waste . . ..
Undoubtedly competition involves waste. What
human activity does not? The wastes of democracy are
among the greatest obvious wastes, but we have com-
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pensations in democracy which far outweigh that waste
and make it more efficient than absolutism.76
Clearly, the Supreme Court in the 1950's and 1960's believed
that Congress preferred less concentrated market structures, includ-
ing situations in which there could be an efficiency loss and the like-
lihood of cartelizing tendencies was remote. Even if a narrow ex-
ception for evidence of efficiencies were permitted-when the
likelihood of competitive injuries was slight, the predicted efficien-
cies were capable of clear demonstration in court, and there was
some likelihood that the efficiencies would be converted into signifi-
cant competitive effects-that would still reflect an essentially "po-
litical" determination to pay an economic price to serve non-
economic goals. That position seems to be a valid interpretation
of Congress' will.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the trend toward use of an exclu-
sively economic approach to antitrust analysis excludes important
political considerations that have in the past been seen as relevant
by Congress and the courts. Such considerations as the fear that
excessive concentration of ec6nomic power will foster antidemo-
cratic political pressures, the desire to reduce the range of private
discretion by a few in order to enhance individual freedom, and the
fear that increased governmental intrusion will become necessary
if the economy is dominated by the few, can and should be feasibly
incorporated into the antitrust equation. Although economic con-
cerns would remain paramount, to ignore these non-economic fac-
tors would be to ignore the bases of antitrust legislation and the
political consensus by which antitrust has been supported.
76L. BR ms, THE CtsE OF BIcNEss 105 (1934), quoted in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534-35 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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